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ABORTION FUNDING RESTRICTIONS: STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS EXCEED
FEDERAL SAFEGUARDS
A concept of personal liberty antedating the United States Constitu-
tion inhibits state intrusion in some spheres of human *activity other-
wise unprotected against governmental intrusion.1 Neither the United
States Constitution nor the Bill of Rights explicitly protects an in-
dividual's right to privacy.2 Nevertheless, constitutional decisions of the
United States Supreme Court delineate a right to privacy that limits
the exercise of governmental authority affecting decisions and activities
the Court considers within the purview of the individual.' In Roe v.
See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-3 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
TRIBE]. The right to privacy, once defined as the right to be left alone by the government,
may be "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man."
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But see Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (overruling Olmstead v. United States on other
grounds). Professor Tribe identifies natural law, common law, and statutes as possible
sources of the individual's right to be left alone. TRIBE, supra, § 15-3. Tribe notes, however,
that none of the three sources adequately protects the contemporary notion of privacy. Id.
The commentator suggests that the source of individual liberty is an inalienable right pro-
tected by the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution. Id. (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)). See generally Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Henkin]; Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal
Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 670 (1973). The realm of family life is one area with which the
state generally may not interfere. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 229-34 (1972)
(parents' right to withdraw from school, for religious reasons, children who have acquired a
basic education); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (parents' right to send
child to private school); Myer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-403 (1923) (parents' right to
have children learn German in school).
2 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965) (right to privacy exists although
not specifically articulated in Constitution). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 209 n.2
(1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (right to privacy not mentioned in Bill of Rights); Craven, Jr.,
Personhood- The Right to Be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE L. J. 699, 700-02 (advocating distinction
between degree of constitutional protection afforded fundamental rights and that afforded
more ordinary rights).
' See generally Henkin, supra note 1; Kauper, Penumbras, Emanations, Things Funda-
mental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as Kauper]. In 1905, the Supreme Court recognized the existence of a sphere within
which the individuals' will reigned supreme and the individual rightfully could dispute
governmental authority to interfere with the exercise of his will. Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905). The Jacobson Court upheld the validity of a local
regulation providing for free compulsory vaccinations of all adults, noting that the constitu-
tional guarantee of liberty does not imply an absolute right to be wholly free from any
public restraint. Id. at 25-26. Subsequent cases also recognized that the individual's right to
privacy coexists and often conflicts with the state's police power. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 596-98 (1977) (upholding, as reasonable exercise of police power, statute requir-
ing computerized records of persons receiving prescription drugs for which both legal and
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Wade,4 the Supreme Court declared that the right to privacy encom-
passes a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy during the first
trimester.' In the same decision the Court emphasized that the state re-
illegal markets exist); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 406-09 (1975) (state interest in family rela-
tions sufficient to justify one year of residency as prerequisite to divorce); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-66 (1969) (categorization of materials as obscene insufficient to
justify criminal penalties for private possession). See also Isaacs, The Law of Fertility
Regulation in the United States, 19 J. FAM. L. 65, 65-68 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Isaacs].
The zone of privacy that the Constitution accords the individual encompasses both the right
to avoid disclosure of personal matters and the right to make certain important decisions in-
dependently. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977); see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
714 (1976) (areas of decision include marriage, child rearing and education, procreation, con-
traception, and family relationships). But see Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 245-49 (1976)
(policeman has no fundamental right to privacy in deciding how to groom hair).
The Supreme Court explicitly recognized the fundamental right to privacy in making
procreative decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut, invalidating a Connecticut statute forbid-
ding the use of contraceptives by married couples. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). The Court did
not agree on any specific Bill of Rights provision as the basis of the asserted constitutional
right to privacy. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, found that the right emanates
from the penumbras of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments, applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 484-85. The first amendment protects free
speech and association. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The third amendment protects against forced
quartering of troops in citizens' homes, and the fourth amendment protects citizens against
unreasonable search and seizure. U.S. CONST. amend. Ill, IV. The fifth amendment protects
individuals against compulsory self-incrimination. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The ninth amend-
ment reserves to the people rights not enumerated specifically in the Constitution. U.S.
CONST. amend. IX. Concurring, Justice Goldberg found the right to privacy to be among the
ninth amendment rights not explicity enumerated in the first eight amendments to the Con-
stitution. 381 U.S. at 499. Justices Harlan and White, also concurring, derived the right to
privacy from the protection the fourteenth amendment due process clause affords liberty.
Id. at 500, 502-04. Justices Stewart and Black dissented, dissatisfied with the statute but
unable to find any constitutional right of privacy that would support striking the statute. Id.
at 507, 527. Justice Black strongly criticized the majority's apparent reliance on the doctrine
of substantive due process, see note 18 infra, which the Court had discredited earlier. 381
U.S. at 520-24 (Black, J., dissenting). See generally Kauper, supra note 3.
The right to privacy in procreative decisions is an individual right rather than a right
peculiar to marriage relationships, and the state may not limit the exercise of the right by
married couples or single individuals. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (statute
regulating distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons invalidated). See also Carey
v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687-91 (1977) (state may not ban commercial distribu-
tion of nonprescription contraceptives to minors or restrict sales to adults).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 153. The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade determined that the basis of the right
to privacy is the fourteenth amendment concept of personal liberty and restrictions on state
activity. Id.; see note 3 supra (concurring opinions of Justices Harlan and White in
Griswold). The fourteenth amendment prohibits the states from depriving any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of the law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. The
Roe Court characterized as fundamental the woman's right to decide whether to terminate
her pregnancy or give birth. 410 U.S. at 155. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Roe, noted
that the right to an abortion is not so integral to the American tradition and conscience that
the Court should characterize it as fundamental. Id. at 174. A fundamental right is one "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). But
see Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (overruling Palko v. Connecticut on other
grounds). The exact contours of the right to privacy remain undetermined, see Adamson v.
1470 [Vol. 39:1469
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tains an interest in protecting the health of the mother6 and the poten-
tial life of the fetus.7 Roe and the companion case of Doe v. Bolton8 in-
validated most state legislation regulating abortion.' Legislatures
California, 332 U.S. 46, 53-55 (1947), although the Supreme Court has defined a fundamental
right as one the Constitution implicitly or explicitly protects. See San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973) (defining fundamental right in equal pro-
tection context); note 19 infra.
As the Roe Court noted, only a compelling state interest may justify a regulation
limiting the exercise of a fundamental right such as the right to privacy. 410 U.S. at 155-56.
See also Kramer v. Union School Dist., 397 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 634 (1969). Legislation limiting the exercise of a fundamental right must be narrow
and specific, accomplishing only the legitimate state interest at stake. 410 U.S. at 155-56.
The Roe Court's fourteenth amendment analysis, as Justice Stewart frankly conceded in his
concurring opinion, is reminiscent of the disfavored doctrine of substantive due process. Id.
at 167-68; see note 18 infra (substantive due process). See generally Byrn, An American
Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 807 (1973); Ely, The Wages
of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. J. 920 (1973); Heymann and
Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and its Critics, 53 B.U.L. REV. 765 (1973);
Perry, Abortion, The Public Morals and the Police Power The Ethical Function of
Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Perry]; Tribe,
Foreward. Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1973); Wardle, The Gap Between Law and Moral Order: An Examination of the Legitimacy
of the Supreme Court Abortion Decisions, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV. 811 [hereinafter cited as
Wardle].
The Roe Court noted that the right to privacy in making the abortion decision is not ab-
solute. 410 U.S. at 154. The degree of the state interest in limiting a woman's access to abor-
tion, while always legitimate, becomes compelling enough to justify regulation only after
the first trimester. Id. at 162-63; see note 3 supra (certain state interests may justify
limiting exercise of personal liberty); text accompanying notes 6-7 infra (state interest dur-
ing second trimester and after viability). Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)
(woman and attending physician free to make abortion decision without state interference
or regulation) with Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 65-67, 79-81 (1976) (state
may require physician to inform patient about dangers of and alternatives to abortion, ob-
tain prior written consent from woman, and demand that doctors and health facilities report
information about abortions performed) and Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 10-11 (1975)
(state may prohibit nonphysicians from performing first trimester abortions).
' Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (state interest in protecting mother's health
becomes compelling enough to support state regulation reasonably directed at maternal
health after first trimester).
I Id. at 163-64 (state interest in potential human life becomes compelling after viability
and will support proscription of abortions except when necessary to preserve mother's life
or health). The Roe Court defined viability as the point at which the fetus is capable of
meaningful life outside the womb, id. at 163, or has the potential to live outside the womb,
albeit with artificial aid. Id. at 160. The Court has adhered to its decision that viability is the
dividing line between the woman's right to abortion and the state's power to limit the right.
See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388-89 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 63-65 (1976). But, the Court's characterization of viability as a matter of medical
judgment, skill, and technical ability, 428 U.S. at 64, frequently provides an inexact stan-
dard, particularly when state statutes do not provide uniform definitions of viability and
may render a physician criminally liable for misjudgments. See Comment, Survey of Abor-
tion Law, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 128-39 [hereinafter cited as Survey].
* 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
' See Goldstein, A Critique of the Abortion Funding Decisions: On Private Rights in
the Public Sector, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 313, 314 & n.4 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Gold-
1982] 1471
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responded to the decisions with new statutory enactments, many of
which restrained women attempting to exercise their right to elect an
abortion rather than childbirth. °
Constitutional challenges to post-Roe statutes have embroiled
courts in the controversy surrounding the scope of a woman's right to
obtain an abortion and the state's concommitant authority to regulate
certain aspects of the decision.' In evaluating the constitutionality of
stein]; Survey, supra note 7, at 106-11. In 1973, only New York, Alaska, Hawaii, and*
Washington permitted abortion on demand, subject solely to procedural requirements. See
ALASKA STAT. § 11.95.060 (1970); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 453-16 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. PENAL CODE
§ 125.05 (McKinney Supp. 1972-73); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.02.060-9.02.080 (Supp. 1972). The
Roe Court struck down a Texas penal statute imposing criminal sanctions for procuring or
attempting to procure an abortion except when necessary to save the mother's life. See Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 117-18; TEX. STAT. ANN. §§ 1191-1196 (Vernon 1961), transferred to §§
4512.6-.7 (Supp. 1973)). A majority of the states had similar statutes. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
at 118 n.2. In Doe, the Supreme Court invalidated a Georgia statute based on the Model
Penal Code. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 182; GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1201-03 (1971), reprinted
in 410 U.S. at 202-05; MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Draft 1962). The Court in-
validated the Georgia statute's restriction of abortions to Georgia residents, and the
statute's requirements that a doctor perform the abortion in an accredited hospital, with the
approval of the hospital staff and only after two physicians confirmed the attending physi-
cian's decision. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 193-201.
10 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 28-4 (1974) (declaration of purpose in post-Roe abortion law
expressing dissatisfaction with Roe decision and intent to limit abortion as much as con-
stitutionally permitted). The Rhode Island legislature unsuccessfully attempted to establish
a conclusive presumption that human life begins at conception. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-3-4
(1973) (declared unconstitutional, Doe v. Israel, 482 F.2d 156 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 993 (1974)). See generally Bryant, State's Legislation on Abortion after Roe v. Wade:
Selected Constitutional Issues, 2 AM. J. L. & MED. 101 (1976). The United States Congress
enacted several versions of the "Hyde Amendment," riders to the appropriations bills of the
Departments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare, that limited federal reimburse-
ment of state payments for abortions under the Social Security Act. See text accompanying
note 14 infra.
,1 See, e.g., H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 407-10 (1981) (upholding statute requiring
parental notice prior to abortion); Nyburg v. City of Virginia, 667 F.2d 754, 757-58 (8th Cir.
1982) (city ordinance not allowing doctors to use municipal hospital for abortions unless
necessary to save life of mother held unconstitutional); Deerfield Medical Center v. City of
Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 334-38 (5th Cir. 1981) (zoning decision barring abortion clinic
in commercial zone constitutes direct burden on abortion decision not justified by signifi-
cant state interest); Valley Family Planning v. North Dakota, 661 F.2d 99, 101-02 (8th Cir.
1981) (invalidating state statute denying public funds to family planning organizations pro-
viding abortion referral services); Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 F.2d 476, 485-87 (5th Cir. 1981)
(state interest in promoting institution of marriage and husband's interest in procreative
potential of marriage sufficient to justify burden that statutory spousal notice provision im-
posed); Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198,1205-08,
1211 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding unconstitutional provisions of municipal ordinance requiring
parental consent to minor's abortion, informed consent obtained by physician, 24 hour delay
between signing consent and obtaining abortion, and humane disposal of fetus), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 2268 (1982); Women's Medical Center of Providence, Inc. v. Roberts, 530 F. Supp.
1136, 1145-54 (D.R.I. 1982) (informed consent statute unduly burdens constitutional right to
privacy); American Federation of Gov't Employees, 525 F. Supp. 250, 252-53 (D.D.C. 1981)
1472 [Vol. 39:1469
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governmentally erected obstacles, the Supreme Court has distinguish-
ed direct state interference from indirect interference, and has in-
validated only direct state interference." The Court has upheld, as an
indirect burden on the exercise of the fundamental right to obtain an
abortion, the curtailment of government funding for the abortions of
indigent women otherwise covered by the Medicaid program, Title XIX
of the Social Security Act (Title XIX or Medicaid)."3 The United States
(Office of Personnel Management enjoined from excluding therapeutic abortions from
federal employees' health benefits plan).
1" See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314-18 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474-75
(1977). The McRae and Maher Courts specifically distinguished direct state interference
with a protected activity from state encouragement of an alternate activity. 448 U.S. at 315;
432 U.S. at 475. The Supreme Court asserted that indigency, not the state-imposed restric-
tions on medicaid funding, limits access to abortion. 448 U.S. at 315; 432 U.S. at 474; see text
accompanying notes 34 & 54 infra. The dissents in Maher and McRae sharply contested the
legitimacy of the Courts' distinction. See text accompanying notes 44 & 60 infra.
The Maher Court asserted that earlier decisions justified the distinction between
direct and indirect burdens. 432 U.S. at 475-76 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) and
American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974)). In Buckley the Court upheld the selective
public funding of presidential campaigns as an indirect burden, noting that minor party candi-
dates' inability to campaign effectively derives from the inability to obtain private contribu-
tions rather than from the lack of public funding. 424 U.S. at 94-96. The Buckley court,
however, subjected the funding provisions to a more stringent review than the rational rela-
tion test the Maher majority employed to evaluate the abortion funding restrictions. See
Yarbrough, The Abortion Funding Issue: A Study in Mixed Constitutional Clues, 59 N.C. L.
Rav. 611, 617-18 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Yarbrough]. In American Party, the Court in-
validated the more direct burden imposed by restrictions on candidates or party access to
ballot. 415 U.S. at 794-95.
The Court had more difficulty distinguishing cases invalidating governmental refusals
to disperse benefits to individuals exercising constitutional rights. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp.
v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269 (1974) (invalidating one year residency requirement
conditioning receipt of medical benefits); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627-38 (1969)
(invalidating residency requirement conditioning receipt of welfare benefits); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (invalidating state refusal to disperse unemployment com-
pensation to woman unwilling, for religious reasons, to accept employment requiring Satur-
day labor). See also Yarbrough, supra, at 615-20.
"s See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 311, 326-27 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
478-79 (1977); text accompanying notes 31, 39 & 48-57 infra. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976
& Supp. m 1979). Title XIX of the Social Security Act (Title XIX or Medicaid) provides par-
tial federal reimbursement to participating states assisting medically needy people with
medical costs. Id. States must fund medical services to the categorically needy, id. §
1396(a)(6)(A), but need not fund services to the medically needy, id. § 1396(a)(10)(C). States
participating in the medicaid program must provide medical treatment in five categories, in-
cluding family planning services. Id. § 1396d(a). Title XIX does not require states to fund all
medical treatment in every category, but each state must establish reasonable standards
commensurate with the statute's purpose for determining the extent of medical services the
state will fund. Id. § 1396a(17).
State statutes restricting medicaid funding of abortions for indigent women are of
varying severity. See, e.g., Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 122-23 (1st Cir. 1979)
(Massachusetts statute precluded abortion funding unless abortion necessary to preserve
19821 1473
WASHINGTONAND LEE LA WREVIEW
Congress has enacted a series of amendments to annual appropriations
bills, popularly labelled the Hyde Amendments, that deny federal reim-
bursement to states that authorize Medicaid funding for certain
categories of abortions. 14 The Supreme Court sustained the constitu-
tionality of Hyde Amendment funding restrictions on both non-
therapeutic and therapeutic abortions." The Supreme Court further
determined that neither Title XIX nor the United States Constitution
mandates state funding of any abortion in the absence of federal reim-
bursement for the expenditure. 6 In upholding the legislative curtail-
ment of Medicaid allocations for the abortions of indigent women, 7 the
Supreme Court rejected substantive due process 8 and equal protec-
mother's life or in cases of rape or incest properly reported), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952
(1979), appeal dismissed, 448 U.S. 90 (1980); D.R. v. Mitchell, 456 F. Supp. 609, 610 (D. Utah
1978) (Utah statute precluded funding of abortions except when necessary to preserve
woman's life), rev'd, 617 F.2d 203 (10th Cir. 1980); Doe v. Busbee, 471 F. Supp. 1326, 1329
(N.D. Ga. 1979) (Georgia regulation authorized funding when abortion necessary to preserve
mother's life or protect against severe damage to mother's health, or in cases of rape or in-
cest properly reported). See generally Isaacs, supra note 3; Comment, The Hyde Amend-
ment An Analysis of its State Progeny, 5 UNiv. DAYTON L. REV. 313 (1980). Congressionally
imposed federal restrictions on medicaid funding have differed from year to year. See note
14 infra (discussion of Hyde Amendments).
" See Pub. L. No. 96-369, § 101(c), 94 Stat. 1352 (1981) (states may refuse to fund any
Medicaid abortion services); Pub. L. No. 96-536, § 109, 94 Stat. 3170 (1980) (limits federal
abortion funding to life endangering situations, certain pregnancies resulting from rape or
incest, and ectopic pregnancies); Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1979) (no funding for
abortion except when life of mother endangered or when pregnancy is result of promptly
reported rape or incest); Pub. L. No. 95-480, § 120, 92 Stat. 1586 (1978) (no funding of abor-
tion except when life of mother endangered, when pregnancy is result of promptly reported
rape or incest, or when two physicians determine pregnancy would result in severe long
term health problems for mother); Pub. L. No. 94-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460 (1977) (same); Pub.
L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1434 (1976) (no funds for abortions except when life of mother
endangered by carrying fetus to term). See also note 13 supra (Medicaid provisions of Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976 & Supp. III (1979)).
11 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326-27 (1980) (holding constitutional the 1979
Hyde Amendment, denying federal reimbursement to states for certain therapeutic abor-
tions); text accompanying notes 48-61 infra.
An abortion is the premature expulsion of a developing child from the womb prior to
viability whether the expulsion is spontaneous or induced. See 1 J. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEY'S
DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER A-16 (1981). A therapeutic abortion is one induced
to save the life of the mother, or for other justifiable reasons. See id. at A-17. Justifiable
reasons include serious malformation of the fetus, or a pregnancy resulting from rape or in-
cest. See id. A nontherapeutic abortion is once induced at the request of the woman or her
doctor.
1A See, e.g., Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358, 369 (1980) (upholding state statute
limiting state assistance payments for abortions to those necessary to save woman's life);
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 306-11 (1980) (Title XIX does not require states to fund
medically necessary abortions absent federal reimbursement).
1 See notes 13-14 supra.
18 See note 20 infra. The Roe Court's grounding of the right to privacy in the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause, see note 5 supra , evidences the renewed reliance
on substantive due process that Griswold, see note 3 supra, foreshadowed. See Perry, supra
1474 [Vol. 39:1469
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note 5, at 689-92; TRIBE, supra note 1, at 924 n.5. Professor Perry asserts that substantive
due process connotes a public welfare limit on the legislative perogative to invade an in-
dividuars life, liberty or property. See Perry, supra note 5, at 700. Legislation that does not
promote the general welfare thus constitutionally is beyond the reach of state authority. Id.
at 726-27. The dividing line between statutes that promote the general welfare and those
that do not is never clear, particularly in areas of public morals, when the legislature at-
tempts to impose societal values on the individual. Id. One commentator posits that courts
possess a constitutional and practical mandate to act as "juries" and evaluate legislative ac-
tivities infringing on personal morality. Id. at 728-33. This mandate constitutes the basis of
substantive due process. Id. See also Wardle, supra note 5, at 815-33 (discussion of the con-
tours of the judicial deference owed legislative decisions impinging on personal and societal
concepts of morality).
Judicial support for the idea that state exercise of police powers through economic
regulation infringes on privacy rights developed gradually after the Civil War. See Perry,
supra note 5, at 700. In 1873, the Court determined that regulation of the butcher's trade
did not constitute deprivation of property without due process of law, thus implying a
substantive element to the fourteenth amendment. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall)
36, 80-81 (1873). Similarly, the Court invoked a judicial duty to protect implied or reserved
individual rights to invalidate a state tax as an unlawful appropriation of private property.
Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall) 655, 662-65 (1874). The Court also upheld legislation
prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, challenged as a deprivation of
property without due process of law. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660-64 (1887). In
Lochner v. New York, the Supreme Court struck down a New York statute regulating
bankers' hours as an invalid interference with the freedom of contract inherent in the four-
teenth amendment's protection of property. 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). Lochner and its progeny
represent a thirty-two year hey-day of substituting judicial for legislative judgment that the
Court implicitly rejected during the 1930's. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937) (upholding minimum wage legislation). The Court explicitly repudiated the doctrine of
substantive due process in 1949. Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron and Metal
Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536-37 (1949) (courts should not construe due process clause so broadly that
Congress and state legislatures are unable to regulate conditions deemed offensive to public
welfare). See generally TRIBE, supra note 1, §§ 8-6, 8-7; Strong, The Economic Philosophy of
Lochner Emergence, Embrasure and Emasculation, 15 ARIZ. L. REv. 419 (1973); McClosky,
Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup.
CT. REv. 34. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not abandon substantive due process,
although the Court never invoked the doctrine by name. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); note 3 supra (right to privacy cases).
Substantive due process provides an analytical framework for examining the
legitimacy of state actions affecting personal liberty. The state police power is the state in-
terest in regulating matters of health, safety, welfare, and morality for the common good.
See Isaacs, supra note 3, at 66. Courts uphold police power regulations when the law is
reasonable and advances a legitimate state purpose. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,
663 (1887). When the exercise of the police power impinges on a constitutionally protected
or fundamental right such as the right to privacy, courts apply a more stringent test than
mere rationality. See Kramer y. Union Free School Dist., 397 U.S. 621, 627 (1969). The state
must show that th7 law is necessary and narrowly drafted to promote a compelling state in-
terest. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964); Isaacs, supra note 3, at
67 n.5; note 3 supra (right to privacy is fundamental right); note 5 supra (compelling state in-
terest standard in context of abortion regulation). Statutes generally pass constitutional
muster when courts apply the rational relation test. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
478-80 (1977). Courts applying the compelling state interest standard, however, rarely sus-
tain challenged statutes. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serv., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 690-91
(1977). But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-20 (1944) (upholding Japanese
internment during World War H).
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tion19 challenges to the statutes." At the same time, the Court
acknowledged the probability that the funding restrictions would
19 See note 20 infra. Equal protection demands legislative rationality in the selection of
the class singled out for special treatment. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1966).
Courts test rationality by examining whether the statutory classification is "reasonable in
light of its purpose." McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). Professor Tribe argued
that deference to legislative purpose encourages courts to equate the rationality require-
ment with a strong presumption of constitutionality. See TRIBE, supra note 1, § 16-2. Courts,
thus, are tolerant of underinclusive or overinclusive classifications unless the classifications
clearly result from the arbitrary exercise of power. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351
(1979); Matthews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976). When the challenged legislative
classification hinders the exercise of a fundamental right or burdens a suspect classification,
however, courts subject the statute to strict scrutiny and will hold it unconstitutional ab-
sent a compelling justification. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717,721-22 (1973) (state failed
to meet heavy burden justifying use of suspect classification when state denied resident
aliens admission to bar); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627-38 (1969) (fundamental right
to travel impinged by depriving indigents of welfare benefits because of less than 1 year's
residency); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486-96 (1954) (legally compelled segrega-
tion of students held inherently unequal treatment that violates equal protection clause).
Although strict in theory, the standard generally is fatal in actuality. See Gunther, The
Supreme Cour4 1971 Term-Forwar& In Search of Evolving Doctrine in a Changing
Court- A Model for a Newer Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 118 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Gunther].
When the classification does not impinge on a fundamental right or a suspect class,
courts subject a statute only to the minimal scrutiny of the rational basis test. See, e.g.,
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-14 (1976) (per curiam); Lind-
sey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 57, 73-74 (1972). See generally Gunther, supra; Tussman &tenBroek,
The Equal Protection of the Laws, 27 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949).
The Burger Court has developed an intermediate standard of review, applied when
neither the compelling state interest nor the minimal rationality standard of scrutiny ap-
pears appropriate. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11 ;1.24 (1971) (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (recognizing dissatisfaction with "two-tier" approach to equal protection analysis in ap-
plication to gender-based classification); TRIBE, supra note 1, at § 16-30; Yarbrough, supra
note 12, at 612. Legislation employing sensitive but not suspect classifications or impinging
on important but not fundamental rights may trigger intermediate review. See, e.g., Trim-
ble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770-76 (1977) (invalidating statute depriving illegitimate
children of inheritance when father died intestate because not least restrictive means of
achieving state interest in promoting family relationship); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197-202 (regulation authorizing sale of 3.2% beer to females at younger age than males in-
sufficiently related to legitimate legislative attempt to protect public health and safety);
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1976) (invalidating rule barring aliens from
federal civil service employment because importance of right outweighs advanced justifica-
tion of administrative convenience); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 640
(1974) (overly restrictive maternity leave policy heavily burdens protected freedoms);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972) (father's interest in retaining custody of children
mandates more than minimal scrutiny).
' See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326-27 (1980) (upholding constitutionality of
1979 Hyde Amendment denying federal reimbursement to states for certain medically
necessary abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469-80 (1977) (constitutional for state to




preclude most indigent women from exercising their right to obtain an
abortion.2
Several recent state court decisions, however, have sustained
challenges to funding restrictions based on state constitutional protec-
tions.' Massachusetts and Connecticut courts have held that the due
process provisions of the Massachusetts and Connecticut constitutions
require those states' Medicaid programs to fund therapeutic abortions,
despite the lack of federal reimbursement." The California Supreme
Court has ruled that the state may not condition receipt of a governmen-
tal benefit on the abdication of the constitutional right to an abortion.
2 4
State courts, thus, have interpreted state constitutional protections of
the right to privacy as more encompassing than federal courts have
found similar federal constitutional provisions.'
The" United States Supreme Court first addressed' the validity of
state statutory restrictions on medicaid funding of abortions in Beal v.
Doe." The Beal Court held, as a matter of statutory construction, that
Title XIX does not require states participating in the Medicaid program
to fund nontherapeutic abortionsY The Court reasoned that Title XIX
2 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314-15 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474
(1977).
1 See text accompanying notes 63-65 infra.
2 See text accompanying notes 66-81 infra.
2 See text accompanying notes 82-94 infra.
See People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 550-51, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113-14, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 329-30 (1979) (California constitution provides greater protection against
unreasonable search and seizure than fourth amendment); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462
Pa. 244, -, 341 A.2d 62, 64 (1975) (defendant's statement, suppressed by suppression
court, is inadmissable to impeach credibility of defendant testifying at trial, in opposition to
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)); State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, -, 520 P.2d
51, 55-58 (1974) (Hawaii constitution affords greater protection against unreasonable search
and seizure than fourth amendment). See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977); Howard, State Courts and
Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62-VA. L. REV. 873, 891-907 (1976);
Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 62 Ky. L. J. 873 (1975).
432 U.S. 438 (1977).
" Id. at 447; see note 13 supra (Title XIX). Plaintiffs in Beal challenged a Pennsylvania
regulation limiting state funding of abortions to cases in which the physician certified the
abortion to be medically necessary. 432 U.S. at 441; see 3 Pennsylvania Bulletin, 2207, 2209
(Sept. 29, 1973) cited in Brief for Petitioners at 4, Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977). The Penn-
sylvania regulation identifies several categories of medically necessary abortions. 432 U.S.
at 441 n.3. In Pennsylvania, an abortion is medically necessary when documentary evidence
supports the physician's determination that the pregnancy constitutes a threat to the
mother's health, that the pregnancy is the result of statutory or forcible rape or incest and
may be a threat to the woman's mental or physical health, or that the infant may be born
mentally deficient or deformed. Id. The regulation further requires that two competent
physicians certify in writing that they concur in the attending physician's decision and that
the doctor perform the abortion in an accredited hospital. Id.
The Beal plaintiffs alleged that Title XIX requires participating states to fund non-
therapeutic abortions. Id. at 440. The Beal plaintiffs also alleged that the Pennsylvania
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grants the states broad discretion to determine what unnecessary
medical services to fund,' as long as the eligibility requirements and the
extent of benefits comport with the statute's objectives.' A state's
refusal to fund nontherapeutic abortions is consistent with Title XIX's
primary objective, the furnishing of medical assistance to individuals
with insufficient income to defray necessary medical expenses."
The United States Constitution does not obligate states par-
ticipating in the Medicaid program to fund nontherapeutic abortions,
even when the state does fund the childbirth expenses indigent women
incur." In Maher v. Roe," the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that state funding of childbirth but not abortion expenses con-
stitutes discriminatory funding in violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment." The Maher Court determined that
indigent women desiring abortions are not a suspect class 4 and that the
regulation violated both the fourteenth amendment equal protection guarantee and the
statutory mandate of Title XIX. Id. at 442. The federal district court found no statutory
violation but upheld the equal protection challenge to the statute's constitutionality. Doe v.
Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173, 186, 191 (W.D.Pa. 1974), modified, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir.
1975). The Third Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the state statute conflicted
with Title XIX, and thus was void, without examining the constitutional issue. Doe v. Beal,
523 F.2d 611, 621-22 (3d Cir. 1975) (en banc), rev'd, 432 U.S. 438 (1977). The Supreme Court
therefore resolved only the question of statutory construction. 432 U.S. at 443-44.
' 432 U.S. at 444.
" Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(17) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (states need not fund all
medical procedures, but must articulate reasonable standards consistent with Title XIX's
purpose for distinctions made).
1 432 U.S. at 444-45; see 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(10)(c) (1976 & Supp. II 1979) (purpose of
medicaid program is to provide necessary medical services to individuals with incomes in-
sufficient to defray costs themselves). The Beal Court reasoned that since nontherapeutic
abortions are not necessary medical services, states need not provide medicaid funding for
them. 432 U.S. at 44-45. The Court further noted that the state's significant interest in en-
couraging normal childbirth throughout the pregnancy justifies a refusal to undercut this in-
terest by funding elective abortions. Id. at 445-46.
Justice Brennan, dissenting, argued that therapeutic abortion, nontherapeutic abor-
tion, and childbirth constitute alternate medically necessary treatment for pregnancy. Id. at
449-52. A state may elect not to fund treatment for pregnancy, but once a state decides to
fund treatment, Title XIX does not authorize the state to fund some pregnancy treatments
and not others. See id. at 449-51.
" Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 466, 478-79 (1977). See also Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519,
521-22 (1977) (per curiam).
32 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
Id. at 478-79; see note 19 supra (equal protection analysis). The Maher plaintiffs
alleged that the Connecticut statute violated both the equal protection and the due process
clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 467. The Court upheld the
statute against the equal protection challenge, see text accompanying notes 34-39 infra, but
did not discuss the due process challenge.
Id. at 470-71. Indigence alone does not identify a class as "suspect" for purposes of
equal protection analysis. Id.; see San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 22-23 (1973) (suggesting that for wealth to be suspect classification, statute must
peculiarly disadvantage group fairly definable as indigent and absolutely deprive them of
desired benefit). Neither is sex a suspect class, though the Supreme Court has subjected
statutes imposing a disproportionate impact on women to a more meaningful level of
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statute did not inhibit the exercise of the fundamental right to privacy in
the abortion decision as delineated in Roe v. Wade." Having eliminated
the need for strict scrutiny, 6 the Supreme Court subjected the statute to
the minimal scrutiny of the rational relation'test, 7 requiring only that
the statute be "rationally related" to a "constitutionally permissible"
state purpose.3 8 The Court concluded that the statute furthered the
legitimate state interest in promoting childbirth rather than abortion
and upheld the statute. 9
Strong dissents in Beal and Maher rejected the majority's statutory
and constitutional rationales for upholding state restrictions on medicaid
funding of abortions." Justice Brennan, dissenting in Beal, argued that
pregnancy requires some medical treatment and that nontherapeutic
abortion is one form of treatment available.4' Brennan concluded that
scrutiny than the rational relationship test imposed in Maher. See note 19 supra (in-
termediate scrutiny).
Is 432 U.S. at 471-74. The Maher Court characterized the Roe v. Wade right to privacy
in deciding whether to terminate an abortion as fundamental but not absolute. Id. at 473-74;
see note 5 supra (discussion of Roe). The Court cited Whalen v. Roe in support of the pro-
position that a fundamental right to privacy does not preclude state regulations to effec-
tuate legitimate state policy. 432 U.S. at 473; see 429 U.S. 589, 598-604 (1977). The Whalen
Court upheld a New York statute authorizing computerized records of doctors' prescrip-
tions of certain dangerous drugs. 429 U.S. at 603-04. The Whalen Court recognized that
possible public disclosure of personal use of the prescription drug might deter some patients
from medical treatment, just as the Maher Court recognized that denial of funding might
deter some patients from obtaining an abortion. Id. at 602; see 432 U.S. at 479. The Maher
Court did not address the important distinction between the nature of the state interest
underlying each statute. Although the purported interest of the Connecticut legislature was
to advance the state's interest in protecting potential human life, id. at 478-79, that interest
does not become compelling until after viability. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163-64. The
Maher Court explicitly distinguished between state interference with a protected right and
state encouragement of an alternative consonant with legislative policy. 432 U.S. at 475; see
note 12 supra & note 97 infra. Presumably, legislative intent also extended to restricting
the availability of abortions, albeit only to indigent women. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at
454-55 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (dissent applies also to Maher v. Roe).
I See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 470-75. The Court applies strict scrutiny or the com-
pellinj state interest standard to legislation challenged under the equal protection clause
only if the legislation affects a suspect classification or the exercise of a fundamental right.
See note 34 supra (statute does not involve suspect classification); note 35 supra (statute
does not impinge on exercise of fundamental right).
See note 19 supra (equal protection, rational relationship test).
432 U.S. at 478-79.
Id. at 479. The Maher Court refused to retreat from the Roe holding that the right
to privacy encompasses the right to abortion in the first trimester. Id.; see note 5 supra.
Rather, the Maher Court asserted that the legislature is the proper place for resolving
policy and value conflicts as "sensitive" as public funding of nontherapeutic abortions. Id. at
479; see text accompanying notes 107-08 infra.
40 See text accompanying notes 41-47 infra. Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall
dissented from the Maher and Beal decisions. 432 U.S. at 448, 454, 462 (Brennan, Blackmun,
and Marshall, JJ., dissenting); 432 U.S. at 482 (Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting).
" Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 449-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see note 29 supra (Brennan
dissent).
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since Title XIX does not authorize selective state funding of medical
treatment,42 state statutes distinguishing between abortion and
childbirth as alternative methods of treatment conflict with Title XIX
and thus should be invalid.43 The dissenters also advanced several con-
stitutional arguments for invalidating the state funding restrictions. The
dissenters contended that funding restrictions exert financial pressure
on the indigent woman's abortion decision and thus unduly burden the
exercise of a fundamental right in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process protection." Additionally, the dissenters took issue
with the majority's equal protection analysis." Justice Marshall, in par-
ticular, advocated imposing a more flexible standard of judicial review
that would consider the importance of the benefit denied, the character
of the class affected, and the nature of the state interest asserted."
Under Marshall's suggested framework, funding restrictions on first
trimester nontherapeutic abortions would be unconstitutional.4"
42 432 U.S. at 450-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'Id.
" See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 484 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
asserted that Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), severely curtailed the
scope of permissible state interference in a woman's decision to abort. 432 U.S. at 485. Addi-
tionally, Brennan asserted that the Court's decision in Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 122
(1976), established that the effect of direct state interference with a protected activity is in-
distinguishable from that of state encouragement of an alternate activity. 432 U.S. at 485-86.
Brennan thus argued that the Connecticut statute constituted an undue burden on the funda-
mental right to decide freely whether or not to abort a pregnancy, and should be imper-
missible absent a compelling state interest to justify the interference. Id. at 489-90; see note
18 supra.
" See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 454 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (applies to Maher also);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 482 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan asserted that the
disparate impact of the Connecticut statute on indigent women violated the equal protection
and the due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at
482-83.
"e 432 U.S. at 458-61 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall sharply criticized the
Maher majority's two-tier equal protection analysis and what he termed the majority's
misreading of the Roe right to privacy. Id. at 457-58; see text accompanying notes 32-39
supra (majority opinion). Marshall applied a version of intermediate scrutiny, see note 19
supra (equal protection analysis), characterizing the right at issue as the fundamental right to
abortion during the first trimester. See 432 U.S. at 457; note 5 supra (Roe right to abortion).
Marshall noted that although poverty is not a suspect classification, a statute's disparate im-
pact on indigents is relevant to an examination of the statute's validity. 432 U.S. at 459-60;
see San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1973) (poverty
may be suspect classification); note 33 supra. Finally, Marshall concluded that the state in-
terest in protecting the potential human life of the fetus cannot justify the significant
deprivation the funding restrictions represent. 432 U.S. at 461; cf. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179, 198-200 (1973) (invalidating, as unconstitutional burden, Connecticut statute requiring
two physicians' concurrence in third physician's abortion decision). See also Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 322 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Yarbrough,
supra note 12, at 621-26 (discussion of Marshall's intermediate scrutiny).
1, 432 U.S. at 461 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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In Harris v. McRae," the Supreme Court relied on the Maher decis-
ion to sustain the congressional decision to curtail federal reimburse-
ment of state medicaid payments for most therapeutic abortions.49 The
McRae Court held that Title XIX imposes no statutory obligation on the.
states to fund even medically necessary abortions when federal reim-
bursement will be unavailable."0 On constitutional grounds, the McRae
Court reasoned that the funding restrictions of the Hyde Amendment
were not governmental obstacles directly impinging on the exercise of a
fundamental right. 1 Rather, the funding restrictions represented a
legislative decision not to remove the existing obstacle, indigency 2 The
Hyde Amendment, therefore, did not constitute a violation of the fifth
amendment due process protection delineated in Roe v. Wade.' The
Court further found no violation of the equal protection component of
the fifth amendment due process clause.5 4 As in Maher, the Court applied
the minimal scrutiny of the rational relation test, noting the absence of a
fundamental right or suspect classification that would require invoking
the more stringent scrutiny of the compelling state interest standard.*"
The McRae majority concluded, in accord with the Maher majority,56
that the funding restrictions were rationally related to the legitimate
legislative objective of protecting human life.57
The McRae dissenters58 distinguished the denial of funding for
" 418 U.S. 297 (1980). See also Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980). The Zbaraz
Court noted that Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), resolved the issue raised in Zbaraz.
448 U.S. at 368-69.
, See text accompanying notes 50-57 infra & 32-39 supra (Maher decision).
" Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 306-11 (1980).
5 448 U.S. at 316-18. The McRae Court relied on the Maher Court's discussion of the
nature of the Roe v. Wade right to privacy in the abortion decision. Id. at 313-15; see note 35
supra.
" 448 U.S. at 317-18. The McRae Court distinguished between a state's legitimate
refusal to fund a protected activity and a refusal to provide another benefit to an individual
who exercised the right to engage in the protected activity. Id. at 317 n.19. But see note 35
supra & note 97 infra (no meaningful distinction between direct and indirect government
burden).
448 U.S. at 318; see note 5 supra.
448 U.S. at 321-26. The McRae Court found no constitutional violation of the
establishment clause of the first amendment. Id. at 319-20.
Id. at 322-26. The McRae Court, having found no infringement of a constitutionally
protected right during its due process analysis, see notes 52-53 supra, relied on Maher to
refute the plaintiffs' assertion that the Hyde Amendment affected a suspect class. 448 U.S.
at 323; see note 34 supra (Maher Court's discussion of indigence as suspect classification).
The McRae Court discerned no difference between the refusal to fund nontherapeutic abor-
tions and the refusal to fund some therapeutic abortions, at least for the purpose of deter-
mining the existence of a suspect classification. 448 U.S. at 323.
See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
s 448 U.S. at 324-26.
See text accompanying notes 59-61 infra. Justice Stevens joined Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, and Marshall, who dissented in Beal and Maher, in dissent from the McRae decis-
ion. See 448 U.S. at 329, 337, 348, 349; note 40 supra.
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therapeutic abortions from the restrictions of nontherapeutic abortions
upheld in Maher.9 Additionally, the dissenters asserted that the selec-
tive dispersal of governmental benefits, when receipt is contingent upon
the abdication of a fundamental right, constitutes state interference in
the exercise of protected liberties in violation of the fifth amendment's
due process clause." Applying equal protection analysis, the dissenters
further argued that the Hyde Amendment should fail even the minimal
scrutiny of the rational relation standard of review."'
The denial of federal reimbursement to repay state funds expended
on abortions does not preclude states from electing to fund abortions.2
Nonetheless, many states have enacted statutes similar to one of the
Hyde Amendments, limiting state funding to therapeutic abortions or
those necessary to save the life of the mother." Several state courts ex-
amining the constitutionality of such statutes have adopted the due proc-
ess or discriminatory funding analysis of the Supreme Court dissenters 4
and have invoked state constitutional provisions to invalidate the
statutes.5
In Moe v. Secretary of Administration & Finance,6 the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts examined the constitutionality of statutory
funding restrictions that limited state medicaid funding to cases in
which an abortion was necessary to prevent the woman's death . 6 The
448 U.S. at 345 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 349-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'o 448 U.S. at 329-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see note 45 supra (discussion of Justice
Brennan's dissent in Maher on due process grounds). In McRae, Justice Brennan carefully
reviewed the illegitimacy of any government program interfering with the exercise of a funda-
mental right by selectively bestowing government favors. 448 U.S. at 334-37. Brennan con-
cluded that state action to deprive an individual of a constitutional right under the guise of
conferring a benefit in exchange for surrendering the right is as constitutionally reprehensi-
ble as a direct burden. Id.
6" See 348 U.S. at 344-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also 348 U.S. at 349-57 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Justice Marshall reiterated his recommendation in Maher, see note 47 supra,
that the majority abandon the rigid two-tier equal protection analysis and adopt a more
flexible standard of review, 448 U.S. at 343-44; see text accompanying notes 44-47 supra.
See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977).
See, e.g., 1980 Cal. Stats. ch. 510, § 2, item 287.5; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 29, § 20B
(West Supp. 1980-81).
" See notes 34, 45, & 61 supra.
65 See, e.g., Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625
P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (Cal. 1981); Moe v. Secretary of Adm. and Fin., 1981 Mass. Adv.
Sh. 464, 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981); Doe v. Maher, [1981-1982] 8 FAM. L. RPTR. (BNA) 2006
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1981).
1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 464, 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981).
6 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at ___, 417 N.E. 2d at 390, 397-404. The Massachusetts
Supreme Court sustained the Moe plaintiffs' due process challenge under the state constitu-
tion and thus did not reach the equal protection claims. Id. at ___, 417 N.E.2d at 397; see
MASSACHUSETTS DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 10. The court also noted that the most recent
Hyde Amendment expressly authorized state legislatures to fund abortions as the
legislatures deemed appropriate, thus precluding supremacy clause problems with a state
funding statute not congruent with federal funding restrictions. Id.; see Pub. L. No. 96-536,
§ 109, 94 Stat. 3170 (1980). The Moe court also stressed the distinction between medically
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court upheld the plaintiffs' due process challenge to the restrictions,
holding that the statute constituted an impermissible burden on the con-
stitutionally protected right to abortion." The Massachusetts Supreme
Court reasoned that the zone of privacy encompassing a woman's right
to determine whether to terminate her pregnancy by abortion, though
not absolute, is an essential element in the state's constitutional
guarantee of due process.69 The fundamental nature of the right to
privacy mandates that any state intervention in the exercise of the right
be neutral.10 Thus, once the state elects to fund a benefit, the state may
not allocate funds on the basis of criteria that directly or indirectly
discriminate against an individual's exercise of a fundamental right.71
The Massachusetts court held that discriminatory funding of the ex-
penses incurred in the medical treatment of pregnancy constituted a
necessary and nontherapeutic abortions, since the Massachusetts Medicaid program funded
only the latter. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at ___, 417 N.E.2d at 394 & n.12; see 106 CODE MASS.
REGS. 450.204, as amended, 185 MASS. REG. 9 (1979).
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at ___, 417 N.E.2d at 397-404. The framework of the Moe
court's due process analysis resembles that advanced by Justice Brennan, dissenting in the
Supreme Court abortion funding cases. See notes 44 & 60 supra (Brennan dissent) & note 18
supra (substantive due process analysis generally). The Massachusetts court first examined
the nature of the right to abortion and concluded that the right is an essential element of
the fundamental right to privacy. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at _ _, 417 N.E.2d at 398-99; see
note 5 supra (right to privacy encompasses abortion decision). Second, the court questioned
whether the statutory restrictions on medicaid funding of therapeutic abortions
discriminatorily burdened thq exercise of the right. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at _ _, 417
N.E.2d at 399-402. Adopting the analysis of the dissenters in the Supreme Court abortion
funding cases, the Massachusetts court acknowledged that while the state had no obligation
to fund any medical expenses associated with childbirth, once the state elected to fund such
expenses, it must do so in a neutral manner. Id. at __ , 417 N.E.2d at 400; see text accom-
panying notes 40-47 & 58-61 supra. The Moe court also declined to distinguish between
direct and indirect burdens on the exercise of a fundamental right. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at
_ ,_ 417 N.E.2d at 401-02; see notes 52 & 60 supra; notes 97-98 infra. The Massachusetts
court concluded that by conditioning medicaid dispersal of benefits for the treatment of
pregnancy on the abandonment of the right to abortion, the state did not satisfy the con-
stitutional obligation of neutrality. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at__ , 417 N.E.2d at 402. Finally,
the Massachusetts court evaluated the justifications the state proffered in support of the
legislation, recognizing the court's responsibility to balance the state's interests in
regulating the abortion decision against the woman's interest in making the decision
without state interference. Id. at _ , 417 N.E.2d at 402-04. The Moe court acknowledged
that its test approximated, but did not equate with, the compelling state interest standard
imposed in similar federal constitutional cases. Id. at __, 417 N.E.2d at 402-03; see note
18 supra. The Massachusetts court employed, a more flexible test, weighing the asserted
state interests against those of the individual. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at _ , 417 N.E.2d at
403. The court noted that the state's legitimate interest in protecting the mother's health is
absent when regulation prohibits medically necessary abortions. Id. at _ _, 417 N.E.2d at
403. The court concluded that the state's interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus
did not justify the severe intrusion into the woman's privacy in making a procreative deci-
sion. Id. at __ , 417 N.E.2d at 404.
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at __ , 417 N.E.2d at 397-99; see note 68 supra.
71 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at ____, 417 N.E.2d at 399-402; see note 68 supra.
"1 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at _ , 417 N.E.2d at 401-02; see note 68 supra.
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governmental intrusion into the constitutionally protected zone of
privacy encompassing the abortion decision. 2 The court concluded that
the state's primary interest, protecting potential human life, does not
justify so severe an intrusion into a woman's privacy as compelling her
to bear an unwanted child. 3 The Massachusetts constitution thus pro-
vides indigent women greater constitutional protection of the right to
privacy than judicial interpretation of similar federal constitional provi-
sions.
7 4
The Connecticut Superior Court for New Haven similarly recognized
that the Connecticut constitutional due process guarantee prohibits
discriminatory funding of medical treatment for indigent women. In Doe
v. Maher," the Connecticut court held that a Medicaid program funding
all necessary medical expenses for eligible recipients, including
childbirth and pregnancy, could not refuse to fund therapeutic
abortions. The court initially determined that discriminatory funding of
necessary medical treatment burdens an indigent woman's freedom of
choice to such a degree that her only practical option is to elect
childbirth.7 The court then assessed the basis of state interference to
determine whether the state interference arose from a compelling state
interest.78 The Connecticut court interpreted Roe v. Wade79 as
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at __, 417 N.E.2d at 402; see note 68 supra.
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at __, 417 N.E.2d at 402-04; see note 68 supra.
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at ., 417 N.E.2d at 400; see text accompanying notes 50-51
supra (due process clause of fifth amendment). The Moe court noted that Massachusetts did
not hesitate to interpret state constitutional guarantees more liberally than the Supreme
Court interpreted federal guarantees. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at __ 417 N.E.2d at 399 &
n.15. See, e.g., District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (Mass.
1980) (invalidating death penalty as violation against prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment); Department of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2202, 393 N.E.2d
406 (Mass. 1979) (state due process protection of parents' right to court-appointed attorney
in state-instituted custody proceedings).
The Moe dissent agreed with the McRae majority and concluded that a financial in-
ducement to elect childbirth does not equal an obstacle to abortion. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at
__ ., 417 N.E.2d at 406 (Hennessey, C. J., dissenting). The dissent stressed that disparate
funding of birth over abortion constitutes one way for a state to achieve its legitimate in-
terest in protecting potential life. Id. at __ , 417 N.E.2d at 407. The dissent concluded
that the plaintiffs' equal protection claims failed because there was no suspect class and the
statute easily passed the rational relation test. Id. at . 417 N.E.2d at 407. The dissent
further concluded that the statute was within the legislative perogative, and that the
judiciary should not overrule the legislature. Id. at __ , 417 N.E.2d at 408.
75 [1981-1982] 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2006 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1981).
76 Id.
" Id. at 2006-07. The Connecticut Superior Court recognized in Doe the right to
privacy as part of Connecticut's concept of "ordered liberty" and held that the right encom-
passes procreative choice and the doctor patient relationship. Id. at 2007. The decision to
abort a pregnancy, therefore, is within the sphere of protected privacy under the Connec-
ticut constitution. Id.
78 Id.
,9 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see note 5 supra.
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establishing that the state's interest in protecting potential human life
never supercedes the woman's right to privacy in matters concerning
her health." The Connecticut Superior Court therefore concluded that
the state's due process provisions protected the indigent woman's right
to obtain necessary medical treatment, including an abortion, without
the state prescribing the options available to her by funding one form of
treatment and excluding another.'
In California, the state's constitutional protection of the right to
privacy has been held to prohibit state imposition of medicaid funding
restrictions on nontherapeutic as well as therapeutic abortions.8 In Com-
mittee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers,8 the California
Supreme Court invalidated state budget acts excluding funds for elec-
tive abortions as an unconstitutional intrusion into protected areas of
private choice. 4 The Myers court characterized the constitutional issue
as the protection of procreative choice from discriminatory governmen-
tal treatment.8 The court refused to extend to the California constitu-
tion the Maher and McRae majorities' reasoning that the refusal to fund
abortions is not a state-imposed obstacle to an indigent woman seeking
to exercise her constitutional right to abortion. 8 The court acknowledged
that the state has no constitutional obligation to fund medical care for
the poor, but placed a heavy burden on the state to justify a
discriminatory or restrictive government benefit program. 7
The Myers court asserted that California cases mandate imposition
of a three-prong test to assess the constitutionality of a government
benefit program that selectively disburses funds.8 Under California law,
the state may justify a conditional benefit program only by showing that
the imposed condition relates to the legislative purpose, that the utility
of the conditions exceeds the harm arising from impairment of the con-
stitutional right to privacy, and that no less offensive measures will
[1981-19821 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2006 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1981).
" Id. The Doe court dismissed the state's argument that funding considerations man-
dated restrictions on state payments for abortions that the federal government would not
reimburse. Id. The court found the argument neither constitutionally relevant nor compel-
ling. Id.
' Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 256, 258, 625 P.2d
779, 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 868-69 (Cal. 1981).
8 29 Cal. 3d 256, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (Cal. 1981); see CALIF. CONST. art. I, §
1 (right to privacy included among inalienable rights); id. § 24 (California constitutional
rights independent of United States Constitution guaranteed rights).
" 29 Cal. 3d at 258, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868-69; see 1980 Cal. Stat. ch.-Si0.
§ 2, item 287.5; 1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 259, § 2, item 261.5; 1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 359, § 2, item 248
(Budget Acts invalidated).
29 Cal. 3d at 256-57, 625 P.2d at 780-81, 172 Cal. Rptr. 867-68.
Id. at 257, 625 P.2d at 868, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868; see notes 34 & 54 supra (Supreme
Court majorities distinguish between direct and indirect burdens on exercise of fundamen-
tal rights).
" 29 Cal. 3d at 263-71, 625 P.2d at 784-89, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 871-76.
" Id. at 265-66, 625 P.2d at 786, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
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achieve the state's objective.89 The court found the funding restrictions
unrelated to the purposes of the California Medicaid programs. Apply-
ing the second prong of the test, the Myers court concluded that the
utility of the funding restriction did not outweigh the severity of the
resulting impairment of the fundamental constitutional right to proc-
reative choice.' Finally, the Myers court asserted that the statutory
scheme the state selected did not further the state interest in providing
the needy with medical care in the manner least offensive to the
woman's right of procreative choice."2 The Myers court found that the
state's selective benefit program limiting abortion funding interfered
with California's constitutional right to privacy in making procreative
choices and considered it irrelevant that the state was under no obliga-
tion to provide the benefit. 3 The court warned of the dangers in permit-
ting the government to nullify constitutional rights by conditioning ac-
cess to government benefits on the sacrifice of constitutional
guarantees. 4
The right to privacy articulated in Roe v. Wade protects women
deciding whether to terminate a pregnancy or give birth from undue
state intervention in the decision-making process. 5 California,
Massachusetts and Connecticut courts recognize that state interference
need not take the form of outright prohibition to deter the exercise of a
fundamental liberty. Governmental "carrots" in the form of benefits
conferred may be as effective in influencing citizen behavior as "sticks"
prodding individuals into particular patterns of behavior by imposing
direct prohibitions or criminal sanctions. The selective conferral of a
Id. at 265-66, 625 P.2d at 786, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 873. The Myers court applied the
three-prong test articulated in Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499,
505-07, 421 P.2d 409, 414-15, 65 Cal. Rptr. 401, 406-07 (1966), for determining the validity of
legislative enactments that exclude potential recipients from government benefit programs
solely because they exercised constitutional rights. 29 Cal. 3d at 265-66, 625 P.2d at 786, 172
Cal. Rptr. at 873.
" 29 Cal. 3d at 271-73, 625 P.2d at 790-91, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 877-78; see CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §§ 14000, 14132(a)(b) (West Supp. 1982) (California medicaid program funds medical
and hospital procedures for recipients of public assistance and other medically indigent in-
dividuals).
" 29 Cal. 3d at 273-82, 625 P.2d at 791-97, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 878-84. The Myers court
found that funding restrictions would severely impair or totally deny an indigent woman's
right to choose abortion over childbirth. Id. at 273-76, 625 P.2d at 791-93, 172 Cal. Rptr. at
878-80. The Myers court concluded that protecting the potential life of the fetus "realistically"
underlies the budget restrictions limiting medicaid payment for abortions. Id. at 278-79, 625
P.2d at 795. 172 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
9 Id. at 282-83, 625 P.2d at 797-98, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 884-85.
, Id. at 263-64, 284-86, 625 P.2d at 784-86, 798-99, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 871-73, 885-86.
Id. at 284-85, 625 P.2d at 798-99, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 885-86.
, See note 5 supra (discussing Roe v. Wade).
, See text accompanying notes 70-73, 78 & 88-92 supra.
See generally Johnson & Bond, Coercive and Noncoercive Abortion Deterrence
Policies, 2 LAW & POL'Y Q.,106 (1980). The commentators consider coercive policies as those
that attempt to lower the benefits or raise the costs associated with the nonpreferred activity,
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government benefit contingent upon the relinquishment of a constitu-
tional right constitutes government interference in the exercise of that
constitutionally protected right. 8 Selective disbursement is government
intervention, even when the government service in question is one the
legislature elected to provide.9 Once the state elects to fund private
medical care for indigent women desiring treatment for pregnancy, the
criteria for determining eligibility should not vary with the method of
treatment the woman and her doctor select.'
The Supreme Court. has asserted that women have an almost ab-
solute right to decide with their doctors to abort rather than carry a
pregnancy to term, at least during the first trimester.'01 Nevertheless,
the Court has sanctioned state and federal legislative programs that ad-
mittedly affect, if not curtail, the woman's exercise of her right."2 The
Maher and McRae courts distinguished, as the state courts refused to
abortion. Id. at 113-14. An example of a government attempt to lower the benefits
associated with abortion is the imposition of a ban or severe restrictions on fetal research.
Id. at 114. The commentators include limits on public funding of abortions as one example of
coercive state action designed to deter abortions by raising the costs associated with abor-
tion. Id. at 114 (also included in category were facility requirements, consultations with
more than one doctor, residence requirements, and spousal or parental notice or consent re-
quirements). Noncoercive policies are those attempting to increase the benefits or lower the
costs of the preferred behavior, in other words, nonabortion. Id. at 117. State activity may
attempt to lower the costs of unwanted pregnancy through family planning programs or en-
courage alternatives to abortion by lowering the costs of childbirth or increasing the
benefits associated with rearing a child. Id. at 117-18 (examples include tax deductions for
children, payments for increased family size such as the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children program, state supported medical and day care facilities, adoption). Medicaid fund-
ing restrictions may exhibit both coercive (limits on public funding of abortions) and non-
coercive (funding of family planning and childbirth expenses) elements. The commentators
conclude that neither method particularly is effective in reducing abortion rates. Id. at
124-26. See also Bennett, Abortion And Judicial Review: Of Burdens And Benefits, Hard
Cases And Some Bad Law, 75 Nw. U. L. Rav. 978, 1010-11 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Ben-
nett].
. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 334 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); note 61 &
text accompanying notes 71-74, 79, 89-93 supra (state courts). See also Memorial Hosp. v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269 (1974) (invalidating one year residency requirement to
receive medical benefits); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (invalidating
residency requirement for eligibility under Aid to Families with Dependent Children pro-
gram); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (invalidating denial of unemployment
compensation benefits to woman whose religious beliefs precluded accepting job requiring
Saturday employment); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528-29 (1958) (invalidating Califor-
nia scheme denying tax exemptions, available to veterans generally, to veterans advocating
overthrow of government); cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding selective public
financing of campaigns of presidential candidates); American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767
(1974) (invalid to restrict candidates' and political parties' access to ballot).
See Bennett, supra note 97, at 1009-17.
' Id.; see note 29 supra (discussion of Title XIX's purpose).
,01 See note 5 supra (discussion of Roe v. Wade).
'0 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1980) (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474
(1977)); text accompanying notes 24-38 & 49-58 supra.
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do, the government's selective benefits program from the criminal sanc-
tions the Roe v. Wade decision prohibited. 3
The Supreme Court has disallowed selective governmental dispersal
programs in other contexts.' Both the dissenters in the abortion fund-
ing cases1"' and numerous commentators"'0 have criticized the Court's un-
convincing efforts to distinguish these cases from the abortion funding
cases. Since a principled distinction seems lacking, presumably the
Court has another basis for upholding selective benefit dispersals in
abortion funding cases. Commentators have suggested that the continu-
ing volatility of the abortion issue and institutional, deference to the
legislature as the proper forum for controversial decisions in matters af-
fecting the public morals are among the factors that may have motivated
the Court."7 Yet, part of the judicial function is to act as a check on the
majoritarian impulses of the legislature, especially when the legislature
seeks to impose public values on private choices."' The Supreme Court
already has struck down legislative efforts to restrict the range in which
a woman may exercise her right to abortion by defining viability"' or im-
posing parental or husband consent requirements."' Similarly, lower
federal courts have invalidated city ordinances directed at zoning abor-
tion clinics out of town"' and overly burdensome informed consent
regulations."' These direct burdens may be qualitatively different than
the indirect burden of imposing on indigent women a positive obligation
to pay for abortions."' But the result in all instances is state interference
with the exercise of the right to privacy in deciding whether to abort or
give birth.
103 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1980) (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474
(1977)). But see text accompanying notes 70, 79, 90 supra.
" See note 112 infra & note 98 supra.
1 See text accompanying notes 39-48 & 59-62 supra.
1 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 9, at 327-34 (1981); Bennett, supra note 97, at 1010-17;
Yarbrough, supra note 12, at 615-20.
1 See, e.g., Perry, Why the Supreme Court was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amend-
ment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1113. 1128 (1981); War-
dle, supra note 5, at 827-30; note 39 supra (Maher Court identifies legislature as proper
forum for resolving sensitive policy issues).
108 See Bennett, supra note 97, at 980-88; Perry, supra note 5, at 706-19; note 39 supra.
10 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63-65 (1976).
"' See Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 646-51 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 69-71, 74-75 (1976); cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 407-10 (1981) (upholding
parental notice requirement for unemancipated and immature minors).
11 See Deerfield Medical Center v. City of Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 335-37 (5th
Cir. 1981).
11 See Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Akron, 651 F.2d 1198, 1202 (5th Cir.
1981) (invalidating regulation requiring physician to provide women detailed information
prior to obtaining informed consent, but upholding written consent requirement). See also
Valley Family Planning v. North Dakota, 661 F.2d 99, 102 (8th Cir. 1981) (supremacy clause
.mandates invalidating state statute banning funding of family planning services making
abortion referrals); note 11 supra.
"I See notes 12 & 97 supra (direct and indirect burdens).
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The state courts discussed above interpreted state constitutional
provisions as more protective of the right to privacy than the similar
federal constitutional provisions."' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's
retreat, in the area of discriminatory funding of abortions and childbirth,
from the substantive protection of the right to privacy in making pro-
creative choices is unsettling, especially as applied to therapeutic abor-
tions. Even if other state courts continue to invoke state constitutional
privileges to protect the federal right to privacy from the indirect
burdens imposed by selective public funding of state health plans,
discrepencies undoubtedly will develop in the scope of the protection af-
forded. It seems incongruous that an indigent woman in California will
receive medicaid funding for an abortion, whether therapeutic or elec-
tive, while a Massathusetts resident may obtain only a medically
necessary abortion at public expense. Yet the distinction may be rational
in light of varying levels of medical care state Medicaid programs pro-
vide. But state legislatures should not be able to inhibit a woman's right
to elect an abortion rather than childbirth, for reasons of health, by the
selective funding of a program. Nor should citizens have to rely on state
court interpretations of state constitutional protections to restrain
government interference with the right to privacy the federal constitu-
tion guarantees. The logic of the state court decisions considered above
compels the conclusion that indirect state interference is nonetheless in-
terference that should be subject to the compelling state interest stand-
ard rather than the rational relation standard the Supreme Court ap-
plied.
CATHERINE O'CONNOR
... See text accompanying notes 66-94 supra.
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